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SCOPE and conduct of congressional investigations have been

subjects of controversy throughout the history of the Republic.
Their powers and procedures have been bitterly attacked and
vigorously defended from the earliest days down to the present time. It is
now well settled that the congressional committee of inquiry is a device
appropriate for use in the performance by Congress of its legislative, supervisory, and informing functions. Public opinion has long accepted this
device as a legitimate tool of our national legislature and the courts have
sanctioned its use in aid of legislation."
As a rule, congressional committees of investigation over the years have
conducted their inquiries with due consideration of the public interest and
with fairness to the organizations and individuals concerned. Unfair investigations have been the exception rather than the rule. But there have
occasionally been conspicuous departures from this pattern. The practices
and procedures of a few committees have given rise to widespread criticism
of the alleged abuses of the investigatire function. This criticism has been
voiced by bar associations, jurists, and law school professors; by newspaper editors and students of government, and by members of Congress
itself. It has found expression in law reviews and lay journals. As a result
of public criticism of the alleged "degradation of the investigative process," several bills designed to reform committee procedures and to protect the rights of witnesses under investigation have been introduced in
both houses of Congress since 1945.
CRITICISM OF INVESTIGATIONS

Although recent developments have brought congressional investigations under heavy and concerted attack, criticisms of them can be traced
back for many years.2 Twenty-three years ago, the present writer summed
t Senior Specialist in American government in the Library of Congress.
I Galloway, The Investigative Function of Congress, 21 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 47, 70
2In

(1927).

i88 Woodrow Wilson wrote:

"Even the special, irksome, ungracious investigations which it [Congress] from time to time
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up a survey of the work of almost three hundred congressional investigating committees by pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of the
inquisitorial function. Under the latter head he found first that there are
serious limitations of procedure so that many "months often elapse between the inception of the committee and its disposition by the house
..when the facts are finally and fully determined, the matter has lost
its news interest for the public."' 3 Secondly, and reminiscent of more
recent events, it was also found that the traditionally hostile attitude of
Congress toward the executive impaired the fairness of investigations.
Proceedings frequently took on a sensational character which Walter
Lippmann characterized as "that legalized atrocity, the congressional investigation, where congressmen, starved of their legitimate food for
thought, go on a wild and feverish manhunt, and do not stop at cannibalism."4
The third defect of the investigative function is that they have imposed
"an unnecessary burden upon the time of the executive and have been a
institutes in its spasmodic endeavors to dispel or confirm suspicions of malfeasance or of
wanton corruption do not afford it more than a glimpse of the inside of a small province of
federal administration. Hostile or designing officials can always hold it at arm's length by
dexterous evasions and concealments. It can violently disturb, but it cannot often fathom, the
waters of the sea in which the bigger fish of the civil service swim and feed. Its dragnet stirs
without cleansing the bottom. Unless it have at the head of the departments capable, fearless
men, altogether in its confidence and entirely in sympathy with its designs, it is clearly helpless
to do more than affright those officials whose consciences are their accusers." Wilson, Congressional Government 271 (1885).
And he went on to say:
"Congress cannot control the officers of the executive without disgracing them. Its only
whip is investigation, semi-judicial examination into corners suspected to be dirty. It must
draw the public eye by openly avowing a suspicion of malfeasance, and must then magnify
and intensify the scandal by setting its committees to cross-examining scared subordinates and
sulky ministers. And after all is over, and the murder out, probably nothing is done. The
offenders, if any one has offended, often remain in office, shamed before the world, and ruined
in the estimation of all honest people, but still drawing their salaries and comfortably waiting
for the short memory of the public mind to forget them. Why unearth the carcass if you cannot
remove it?" Ibid., at 278.
In a special message to the Senate in 1924 President Coolidge contended that:
"The constitutional and legal rights of the Senate ought to be maintained at all times ....
But these rights ought not to be used as a subterfuge to cover unwarranted intrusion ....
Under a procedure of this kind the constitutional guaranty against unwarranted search and
seizure breaks down, the prohibition against what amounts to a Government charge of criminal
action without the formal presentment of a grand jury is evaded, the rules of evidence which
have been adopted for the protection of the innocent are ignored, the department becomes the
victim of vague, unformulated, and indefinite charges, and instead of a government of law
we have a government of lawlessness. Against the continuation of such a condition I enter
my solemn protest...."
3 Galloway, op. cit. supra note z, at 66-69.
4Quoted in Galloway, op. cit. supra note i, at 66-69.
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nuisance to the bureaus." s The fourth and greatest disadvantage of investigative activities is that the executive agencies may escape penalty
for wrong-doing where the majority of the committee members are politically sympathetic to the administration or where the opposing party fears
6

retaliation .

Criticisms of congressional investigations prior to i94o were largely
academic in origin and were chiefly aimed at their defects as a means of
legislative control of the executive branch, as well as at their partisan and
personal motivation and their inefficiency and incompetence for factfinding purposes. Attacks on congressional investigations since i94o have
focussed mainly on their alleged invasion of individual rights, as a result
of the methods pursued by certain committees, especially the House Committee on Un-American Activities; and they have come, in large part,
from bar associations, newspaper editors, leaders of civic groups, and
members of Congress. Many witnesses have refused to answer questions
of the Un-American Activities Committee and have challenged the constitutionality of its procedures in the courts.
The new attacks on investigating committees allege that they can assume the aspects of a trial without the safeguards to the individual of
regular court proceedings; that legislators appear in the role of judges and
combine the functions of prosecuting and judging which should be separated; that as a result of the publicity of committee hearings witnesses
may be exposed to such penalties as dismissal from their jobs, loss of pension payments, character assassination, or injury to their reputations;
that exposure through public hearings can be substituted, in certain types
of cases, for regulation by law, enforced by the courts; that this process
of control by exposure before an investigating committee is not subject to
special rules of procedure laid down by Congress; that the legal rights of
individuals, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, are in practice abridged by
congressional investigations; and that conformity to prevailing ideas is
enforced by fear of censure. The question is raised whether some investi- Ibid., at 67-68. "Secretary Mellon advised President Coolidge to this effect during the
early stages of the Couzens inquiry into the Bureau of Internal Revenue." Ibid., at 70.
6Ibid., at 68 n. 36. After a similar study of all of the investigations since 1789, Professor
Marshall Dimock reported in 1929 that the most common criticisms of congressional committees of investigation were that "they are used for political purposes," that "they travel
to distant parts of the country," that they waste time and interfere with members' legislative
duties, that "they do not include technical experts among their personnel," that "the inordinate cost of inquiries ... is disproportionate to their net accomplishments," and that
"they are not bound by any of the accepted rules of evidence. The constitutional rights of the
individual are thereby transgressed." Dimock, Congressional Investigating Committees i6469 (1929).
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gations are not imposing that "tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling" which John Stuart Mill believed to be a danger to democracy-that
"tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its
own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from
7

them.")

On the other hand, in answer to the charge that congressional investigations invade the right of privacy it is contended that "exposure is the
surest guard not only against official corruption and bureaucratic waste,
inefficiency and rigidity but against private malpractices, divisive movements, and antisocial tendencies in the body politic." 8 And the criticism
that investigations are chiefly used as platforms for aspiring politicians is
claimed to be offset by their educational value in creating a public opinion
favorable to the acceptance an d enforcement of new legislation. Certain
public questions are viewed as more suitable for investigation by legislative committees than ad hoc commissions because of the greater publicity
which Congress commands and it is felt that the practice should be continued of compelling private persons to testify before congressional committees on matters upon which legislation may be adopted, subject to
certain minimum standards. 9
Resentment at the methods employed by certain congressional investigating committees led to a study of the subject by the Committee on the
Bill of Rights of the Bar Association of New York City. In its December
1948 report, which was adopted by the Association, the Committee found
that most complaints embodied the idea that inquiries into witnesses' personal affairs violated "some right of the individual to immunity from
official inquisition or some right in the nature of a 'right of privacy.'
Most complaints were also found to involve charges that investigations
resulted in serious damage to personal reputations. ° The Bar Association
Committee felt that some of the conditions complained of are inherent
in the conduct of the legislative process or are due to the shortcomings of
particular individuals concerned in making the investigation. Much of the
criticism, however, the Committee considered justified and it felt that
certain rules could be adopted which would insure to a much greater degree the observance of ordinary principles of fairness and justice.
7 For a good summary of recent criticisms, consult Van Schaick, Individual Rights and
Congressional Investigations, Editorial Research Reports 53-57 (January 28, 1948).
8Wyzanski, Standards for Congressional Investigations, N.Y. City Bar Rec. 1o3 (1948).

9Ibid.
10 Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on the Bill of Rights, Report
on Congressional Investigations x (December X4, 1948).
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All this public criticism had its repercussions and echoes in Congress
where, beginning with the Hook bill in the 79 th Congress, x" there was introduced a series of a dozen bills intended to prescribe the procedures of
investigating committees and to protect the rights of witnesses. In the
House of Representatives, Representative Holifield (D., Cal.) introduced
a resolution12 to create a select committee to make an investigation of the
conduct of investigations by committees of the House. This resolution and
the House bills mentioned above were referred to the Committee on Rules
which took no action upon them from 1945 to 1950.

In the Senate the then majority leader, Senator Scott W. Lucas
(D., Ill.), took the lead in calling attention to the abuses of investigation.
He introduced resolutions in both the 8oth and 8ist Congresses for the
reform of committee procedures.3 The Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration held hearings on his resolution in July 1949, at which
Senator Lucas testified that he was shocked that no code of conduct governed the committees. While the tactics of most Senate investigating
committees during his service in the upper body had been above reproach,
he cited the methods employed by the joint committee to investigate the
Pearl Harbor disaster and the Howard Hughes "fiasco" of the Senate
War Investigating Committee as the immediate cause of the introduction of his resolution.
"I came to the conclusion," continued Senator Lucas, from many expressions of public opinion, "that the time had become ripe for the necessary reform of committee procedures." In his resolution he had "tried to
strike a balance between the protection of witnesses from committee abuse
and the imperative necessity of going forward with the important work of
congressional investigating groups."'' 4 Later, Senator H. Alexander Smith
(R., N.J.) addressed the Senate on the defects in its investigative procedures, apropos of the current investigation of disloyalty in the State
Department by a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
"The procedure for investigating such suspicions," he said, "must be effective in identifying the guilty; it must not implicate or injure the innocent
by premature publicity; and it must under no circumstances become an
H.R. 1834, 79 th Cong. ist Sess. (i945).
XH.Res. 16, 81st Cong. Ist Sess. (i949).
"3Sen. Con. Res. 44, 8oth Cong. 2d Sess. (1948); Sen. Con. Res. 2, 8ist Cong. ist Sess.
(i949). Identical resolutions were introduced in the House by Representatives Sabath (D.,
Ill.), and McCormack (D., Mass.).
14 Reform in Procedure before Congressional Committees, Hearings before the Committee
on Rules and Administration on Sen. Con. Res. 2, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. 9, io, 24 (1949).
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instrument for personal or partisan advantage."'' 5 Senator Smith questioned whether present techniques of investigation in Congress are sufficiently fair to the innocent. He urged the careful review of present procedures and the adoption of protective reforms. He also suggested the possibility of conducting investigations through an independent body. 6
Finally, Senator Wayne Morse (R., Ore.), in an eloquent Senate
speech on April 24, 1950, asserted that
[wle must be on guard that we ourselves do not follow procedures which jeopardize
or endanger the freedom of the individual. ... What real protection is there to a citizen in the United States today if the executive and legislative branches of our Government proceed in the guise of a Senate investigation to do irreparable damage to
the reputation of individual citizens? 7
PROPOSED REFORMS
During the past twenty years, many proposals for reforms in the conduct of congressional investigations have been made. These proposals
may be grouped into four principal categories: (I) the delegation of certain types of inquiries to various outside agencies; (2) a ban on the creation of special investigating committees of Congress; (3) the voluntary
adoption of codes of fair conduct by congressional committees; and (4)
the imposition of mandatory standards of fair play upon investigating
committees either by statute or by standing rules.
DELEGATION OF INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION

While conceding the necessity of the investigative function, several
close students of the problem have recommended the delegation of certain
types of inquiries to bodies outside of Congress. They suggest that the
delegation be made to ad hoc committees set up for the specific purpose of
conducting a particular investigation. Such bodies could be composed of
government officials or private persons or both; the delegation might also
be made to a permanent government agency. Professor Dimock pointed
out in 1929 that Congress had already given administrative commissions
broad powers of investigation. He suggested that the next logical step
would be to create commissions composed of congressmen and experts along
the lines of the English Royal Commissions. 8 Such commissions have
since been occasionally resorted to. The Temporary National Economic
Committee (1938) and the Hoover Commission (1947) are examples.
Professor McGeary after an intensive study of 146 congressional investigations in the decade of the 1930's made a strong case for the frequent
Is 96 Cong. Rec. 4159- 6r (March 27, 1950).
6

x

Ibid.

17 Ibid., at 5665-69 (April 24, 1950).
op. cit. supra note 6, at 172.

ISDimock,
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delegation of Congress' fact-finding authority. He concluded that research investigations might easily be delegated either to permanent staffs
of advisory experts attached to the standing committees, to legislative
councils like those in the states, to a national economic council like the
National Resources Planning Board, to ad hoc commissions like the
British Royal Commissions,* or to departmental committees. Inquisitorial investigations, he suggested, might be delegated by resolution of
Congress to the regulatory commissions.19 McGeary thought that Congress should retain for its own committees the conduct of supervisory investigations of the executive and that investigations of "hot" subjects
such as civil liberties and organized crime should also be conducted by
congressional committees because of their prestige and full inquisitorial
powers. He concluded, however, that fact-finding investigations could be
delegated to outside agencies which could submit their reports to the
appropriate congressional committee. The committee in turn would hold
public hearings on the report and then submit its own findings to Congress, perhaps in the form of a bill.20
Impressive arguments are advanced for the delegation of certain inquiries to outside bodies. Congressmen are already overburdened both by
more pressing legislative duties and by the cares of their constituents.**
Inquiries by outside persons would avoid the frequent complaint that congressional committees combine the roles of prosecutor, jury, and judge.
More frequent delegation would relieve Congress of the unfavorable publicity which some investigations incur and eliminate duplicating inquiries
by House and Senate committees. It would also avoid the interruptions
now caused by election campaigns and defeats at the polls. Finally, delegation would dispense with the practice of borrowing administrative personnel in order to staff investigating committees, a practice which has
been criticized in Congress and restricted by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.21
* Consult Finer, The British System, page 554 infra.

** Consult Shils, The Legislator and His Environment, page 57i infra.
x9McGeary, The Developments of Congressional Investigative Power 128-40 (1940).
20Ibid., at r58-6o. A current illustration of such a procedure is afforded by an item in the
General Appropriation Act for I95i which provides $200,000 for the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce "to enable the Committee... to engage by contract the
services of private firms or corporations for making a survey of certificated interstate, overseas, and foreign air carrier operations, with a view to drafting legislation requiring the
separation of mail compensation from any Federal subsidy payments...." 83st Cong. 2d
Sess. 2-3 (Pub. L. No. 759, Sept. 6, x95o). The Committee has retained the firm of Ernst and
Ernst.
21 McGeary, The Development of Congressional Investigative Power, i 6-2o (194o).
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On the other hand, it is recognized that there are large political and
psychological obstacles to delegation of the investigative function: the
attendant loss of publicity to committee chairmen who may win national
renown and higher public office from their leadership of great inquiries,
the traditional legislative jealousy of the executive, the belief that committees are better sounding boards than other bodies, the alleged deficiencies of other investigative agencies and lack of confidence in their
personnel, or a conflict of political and economic philosophy between Congress and the executive. The questions are also raised whether Congress
does not have broader investigative authority than administrative agencies and whether Congress can delegate its full power of inquiry, although
it is believed that Congress can grant the regulatory commissions adequate powers to conduct any investigation it so desires.Numerous precedents can be found for the congressional delegation of
the investigative function. Congress has occasionally requested agencies
like the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the Tariff Commission to make inquiries in their respective fields. In
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,23 Congress authorized the Bureau
of the Budget to make detailed investigations of the organization and activities of the departments and agencies with a view of securing greater
economy and efficiency in the conduct of the public service. In the Government Corporations Control Act of 1945,24 Congress assigned to the
General Accounting Office the task of auditing the financial transactions
of government corporations.- Thus, the General Accounting Office and
the Budget Bureau are available to assist Congress in the investigation
of the financial affairs and the administrative management of executive
agencies. It has also been suggested that Congress might well delegate
the investigation of un-American activities to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the investigation of election contests and campaign
expenditures to a judicial tribunal.26 Investigation of the feasibility of
individual "pork barrel" projects has long been delegated by Congress
to the Corps of Army Engineers.27

A step in the direction of mitigating the burdens of investigating com-Ibid., at 149-58.
24

59 Stat. 599, 600 (1945), 3i U.S.C.A.

23 42

Stat.

22 (1921),

§§ 850, 857 (Supp.,

31 U.S.C.A. § 18

(1927).

1950).

25Section 206 of the Legislative Reorganization Act, 6o Stat. 837 (1946), 31 U.S.C.A. § 6o
(Supp., ig5o), directs the Comptroller General to analyze the expenditures of each executive
agency. This section, if enforced, would eliminate the need for many congressional investigations.
26 Consult Dimock, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70, 171; McGeary, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 145 n.
27 Maass, Congress and Water Resources, 44 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 576, 592 (195o).
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mittees was taken by the Senate in January 1928, when it adopted a resolution "that the President of the Senate be, and he hereby is, authorized,
on the request of any of the committees of the Senate, to issue commissions
to take testimony within the United States or elsewhere. ' ' 28 This resolu-

tion gave the Vice-President authority to appoint commissions, and to
hold hearings for any Senate investigating committee in any part of the
country or abroad. There is no record of this authority ever having been
used.29 Its use would relieve Senators of the necessity of taking long investigative "junkets" away from Washington while Congress is in
session.
The practice of some state and foreign governments also suggests some
substitute devices that might be employed in Washington to avoid the
abuses charged to congressional investigation. The Moreland Act in New
York, for example, empowers the governor, whenever he so desires, to
appoint a commissioner or commissioners "to examine and investigate
the management and affairs of any department, board, bureau, or commission of the state. ' ' 30 The commissioner can subpoena persons and

records and swear witnesses. He can employ counsel and investigators.
The legislature gives the governor a free hand by making continuing appropriations for the compensation of the commissioners and their expenses. Reports go to the governor for submission to the legislature.
The Moreland commissionerships are reported to have worked well in
New York. Lindsay Rogers states:
[S]ince 1907, when the act was passed, there have been more than seventy com-

missions issued to more than sixty different persons. Rarely, if ever, has the legislature
been able to charge that the governor selected as commissioner a partisan or a nonentity, to criticize the methods of investigation, or to maintain that a report did not
carry conviction. Practically all of the commissioners have been men who had reputations that they wished to preserve.... Such men were careful to provide themselves

with efficient investigators and counsel and did not seek headlines.
Hostility on the part of the legislature has been rare. Indeed, there have been cases
when legislative committees which had already started to probe matters yielded the
field to a Moreland commissioner.... If there were a Federal Moreland Act, Senators

and Representatives might in time be willing to restrain themselves in the same fashion

31
and to wait for a report.
' Sen. J. 125 (1928).
29 Harold Lasswell suggests that Congress can use "civilian panels," composed of parttime, expert advisers, to assist it in connection with questions in need of special study. Lass-

well, National Security and Individual Freedom 26 (195o).

N.Y. Exec. Law § 8.
When Congress Fumbles for Facts, N.Y. Herald Tribune, p. 26, col. 5-7 (March
3o , xg5o). Four states have analogous laws: Idaho Const., Art. 4 § 8 (i89o); Montana Const.,
Art. VII § io (1889); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 52:22-21 (1937); Wis. Stat. § 14.15 (1940).
30

3xRogers,

PROPOSED REFORMS
As an alternative device, Professor Rogers suggests that Congress enact a statute modelled in part on the British Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act of 1921,32 under which it would delegate its investigative function to commissions to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. An investigating commission with full inquisitorial
powers would be set up whenever Congress passed a concurrent resolution
calling for an inquiry into any matter. The rights of witnesses would be
safeguarded by appropriate procedures. The British tribunals of inquiry*
have worked well, it is said, for thirty years; they have proved to be fair
and efficient agencies of investigation; and they have been free from the
abuses attributed to congressional committees.33
Recurring criticisms of congressional investigations and various suggestions for reform recently led Senators Thomas (D., Utah) and Ives
(R., N.Y.) to propose a bill establishing congressional investigating commissions, to inquire into governmental and other matters of public importance upon the passage of a concurrent resolution of both houses of Congress.3 4 The commissions are to be composed of two senators, two representatives, and three other persons to be selected jointly by the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House from a panel appointed by
the President and the Senate. The commissions are to have the power of
issuing subpoenas, which may be enforced by the federal courts. An
immunity provision prohibits any person from refusing to testify on
grounds of self-incrimination. Witnesses are to be afforded the same
immunity from defamation suits as witnesses in United States district
courts.
In introducing his bill Senator Thomas told the Senate that while he
thought that fact-finding investigations should continue to be conducted
under congressional auspices, his scheme was designed to remove investigations from the domain of party politics, which gave rise to suspicions
and misgivings in the minds of the public. Senator Thomas went on to
explain that the proposed bill contemplated no abdication of responsibility
of the standing committees which would continue to carry on routine inquiries, but would enable these committees to perform their historic functions more adequately. There were numerous precedents, he said, for the
* Consult Finer, The British System, page 561 infra.
i Geo. V, C. 7 (1921).

32
33

For a full account of this suggested remedy and the advantages claimed for it, as well as

a description of a recent tribunal of inquiry in England, see series of three articles by Lindsay
Rogers entitled '"When Congress Fumbles for Facts." N.Y. Herald Tribune, p. 22, col. 5-7
(Mar. 29, I95o); ibid., p. 26, col. 5-7 (Mar. 30, 195o); ibid., p. 24, col. 5-7 (Mar. 31, 1950).
34

Sen. 3,775, 81st Cong. 2d Sess. (1950).
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creation of ad hoc commissions, such as the Wickersham, TNEC, and
Hoover Commissions; his bill would merely standardize and formalize
that procedure. Adoption of the proposal would reduce the workload on
Congress and eliminate frequent overlapping and duplication of investiga35
tion of similar subjects between the two houses.
Senator Ives, co-sponsor of the bill, claimed that the proposal would
remedy many of the defects in existing investigative practices, while
retaining initiative and responsibility in Congress. He added that the
commissions to be created under this bill would also be able to look into
exceptional administrative problems which were beyond the jurisdiction
of standing congressional committees. The addition of three members of
the public at large to the investigating group would minimize the excesses
of political motivation, increase its perspective, and reduce the workload
on an over-burdened Congress. The bill was offered, said Senator Ives, as
"a truly bipartisan approach to the entire problem of congressional investigations of the executive branch." 36
Elsewhere, the Senator claimed that a new approach to the problem of
legislative investigations was badly needed. The existing system had
worked satisfactorily for routine inquiries, but "the ordinary congressional
committees have neither the time, the technical competence, nor the capacity for impartiality" which major questions demand. 37 He rejected current proposals for the substitution of presidential commissions because
Congress must have its own first-hand information and is jealous of its
powers and prerogatives. Special commissions authorized by Congress
and appointed by the Chief Justice, along the lines of Lindsay Rogers'
suggestion, might lack legislative membership and their selection by the
Chief Justice had its objections.
BAN ON SPECIAL INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES

Prior to the 8oth Congress it had long been the custom of both the
House and the Senate to create special or select committees to conduct
special investigations. In the early years of our national government Congress referred its business to a legion of select committees. For every bill
and petty claim a separate special committee was set up. In the Third
Congress, there were 350 such committees in the House alone. But their
number rapidly declined with the development of the standing committee system. During the 79 th Congress only a dozen special committees
were established. Although many famous investigations have been con5

3 96 Cong. Rec. 8732-37 (June 15, i95o).
36Ibid.,

at 8738 (June 15, i95o).

37 N.Y.

Times Magazine 58 (Aug. 27, x95o).
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ducted by special committees, the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress recommended on March 4, 1946, that special committees of
investigation be abandoned. 3s The Senate approved this recommendation
in the Legislative Reorganization bill on June io, 1946, but this prohibition was struck from the bill before it reached the House floor and did not
appear in the final act. Although creation of special investigating committees is contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, eight of these committees were established during
the 8oth Congress and nine during the 8ist Congress.3 9
The argument against the use of special committees for investigative
purposes, as made by Senators Thomas, Morse, Holland (D., Fla.),
Donnell (R., Mo.) and others, runs as follows. The jurisdiction of the
standing committees has been so comprehensively described in the 1946
Act as to cover every conceivable subject of legislation. Therefore, to
create a special committee is to trespass upon the assigned jurisdiction of
some standing committee. The standing committees of Congress have
been authorized by the Legislative Reorganization Act to exercise continuous oversight of the execution of the laws by the administrative agencies
within their respective jurisdiction. They have been equipped with professional staffs and expert investigators to assist them in performing their
oversight function. The investigative function of Congress should be performed, therefore, by its standing committees which have been empowered
and equipped for the purpose, instead of relying upon special investigating committees which are sporadic in nature and cannot introduce legislation to give effect to their recommendations.
Moreover, the reformed rules limit members to service on one or two
standing committees each, with minor exceptions, so that they can meet
their legislative responsibilities more effectively. If, in addition, members
are appointed to serve on special committees, the burden of committee
work will be correspondingly multiplied and the old evils of poor attendance and scattered attention will return. Use of special committees might
also lead to a revival of the use of staff personnel borrowed from downtown departments with all the disadvantages of that practice. Creation
of special committees to deal with subjects already assigned to standing
committees would also be a burden to, and impair the efficiency of, the
38 Sen. Rep. No. 1,oii, 79th Cong.

2d

Sess. 6 (1946). Consult also Galloway, Congress at

the Crossroads 55-56 (1946).
39 In the 8ist Congress the subjects covered were small business, organized crime, roof and
skylights in the Senate; and small business, lobbying, use of chemicals, campaign expenditures, veterans education, roof and skylights in the House.
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executive agencies of the government by requiring their officials to repeat
their testimony on the same subjects before several congressional committees.
Furthermore, sporadic inquiries by select committees lack continuity
and fail to provide the members of standing committees with direct
knowledge of the information gathered. In cases where legislative action
is indicated, standing committees find it necessary to do much of the
work over again. Special investigations should be conducted by the subcommittees of the reorganized standing committees having jurisdiction
of the subject matter involved. This has been done, for example, in the
field of national defense, where the old Truman-Mead select committee
has been replaced by a new "watchdog subcommittee" of the Senate
Armed Services Committee.* Modernization of the congressional committee structure, achieved by the Legislative Reorganization Act, was the
keystone in the arch of congressional reform. To set up a series of special
committees would be a regressive step that might lead to the ultimate
destruction of this reform. A subcommittee of a standing committee can
accomplish as much good work as a special committee, given adequate
leadership, powers, and personnel. Finally, it is argued that the diffusion
of energy and responsibility among many standing and special committees, with overlapping jurisdictions, is not conducive to the formulation
of coherent and consistent legislative policies. Nor is it conducive to the
development of a well-recognized and continuing relationship with executive agencies.4o
VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF PROCEDURAL RULES

A third proposed reform in the conduct of congressional investigating
committees is that they voluntarily adopt rules of procedure to govern
the conduct of their hearings and treatment of witnesses. During the past
three years three subcommittees of Congress have taken this step. The
first wa the Procurement and Buildings Subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments. On April 8, 1948 ,
Representative George H. Bender (R., Ohio), Chairman of this Subcommittee, made public seventeen rules of procedure which had been drafted
by its chief counsel, Mr. Henry H. Glassie, and unanimously adopted.
They relate to such factors as the manner in which hearings are to be
* Consult Cook, Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, page 634 infra.
Compare 93 Cong. Rec. 284 et seq. (1947); ibid., at 344 et seq. (1947); ibid., at 568-70
1259o-92 (1949); 96 Cong. Rec. 2011-34 (Feb. 20, 195o); ibid.,
at 63 1-18 (May3, 195o).
40

et seq. (1947); 95 Cong. Rec.
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held, transcripts of hearings, the right to counsel, subpoenas, and final
reports. These rules were designed primarily to assure all persons a fair
hearing and to avoid cluttering the record with irrelevant testimony and
baseless defamatory remarks. It is required that evidence be kept within
reasonable bounds of relevancy. Witnesses are permitted to read sworn
statements into the record, and any person who believes that evidence
given to the Subcommittee is defamatory of his reputation may file into
the record a statement in regard to such evidence.
The second subcommittee to adopt self-imposed rules was the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Expenditures in the
Executive Departments, of which Senator Ferguson (R., Mich.) was
Chairman. These rules provide that no major investigation shall be undertaken, and no public hearings held, without unanimous approval of the
Subcommittee or majority approval of the full Senate Committee. A transcript of all hearings is to be kept, which in the case of executive hearings is
not to be released without approval of a majority of the Subcommittee.
Unless a majority of the Subcommittee determines otherwise, all witnesses have the right to be advised by counsel. In public hearings, persons
being investigated are permitted to cross-examine any other witness whom
4
the Committee calls. y
In its first annual report the Investigations Subcommittee stated that
it had been the practice at the opening of executive or public hearings for
the chairman to make a statement for the record concerning the subject
and purpose of the specific case under investigation. It had also been the
policy of the Subcommittee, in those cases in which public testimony
was given which affected adversely the reputation of a person or otherwise defamed him, to give that person reasonable opportunity to call witnesses in his own behalf and otherwise to answer adequately the charges
made against him. In view of the many different situations which might
possibly arise, it was deemed impracticable, according to the report, to set
down any rigid rule for application in all cases involving the reputation of
a person under investigation.
The third subcommittee to set up "certain guideposts of conduct" was
the "watchdog subcommittee" of the Senate Committee on Armed
Services. Although this Subcommittee did not go as far as the Bender and
Ferguson subcommittees in adopting voluntary rules of procedure, the
statement of its chairman, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D., Tex.), regarding its policies and procedures, showed a commendable spirit of selfrestraint. He asserted that the Subcommittee had no intention of hunting
41Sen. Rep. No. 5, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. 3-4 (1949).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

headlines; its work would be conducted primarily in executive sessions.
Politics would be left at the committee-room door. The committee would
be very diligent not to become "a Monday morning quarterback club,
second-guessing battle-front strategy.... Especially, I have confidence,"
said Senator Johnson, "that the subcommittee will, in all its inquiries
and recommendations, be frank, impartial, and straightforward-blunt
but not unfair, zealous but not persecuting, helpful but not compromising."4
IMPOSITION OF

INIKUM STANDARDS

The final and most frequent proposal in recent years for the reform of
congressional investigations is the imposition, by statute or rule, of minimum standards of committee conduct. This proposal has found expression
in bills and resolutions introduced in the 8oth and 8ist Congresses by
Senator Lucas and Representatives McCormack (D., Mass.), Sabath (D.,
Ill.), Holifield (D., Cal.), Carroll (D., Colo.), Buchanan (D., Pa.), Javits
(R., N.Y.), Douglas (D., Cal.), and Klein (D., N.Y.). Specific codes of
fair play have also been advocated by various spokesmen for the legal profession, including a group of forty-five law school deans and professors,
Judge Wyzanski, the New York City Bar Association, Messrs. Henry H.
Glassie and Thomas M. Cooley-former committee counsel and practicing
attorneys. The American Civil Liberties Union has also offered a bill to
establish fair hearing procedures, and the Washiington Post has set forth
3
a code of ten rules which it thinks Congress should adopt.4
Comparative analysis of these proposed mandatory codes, made by the
writer, shows that upwards of two score separate safeguards for the rights
of individuals have been suggested. The number of proposed safeguards
ranges from three in the Wyzanski suggestions and four in the ArnoldFortas-Porter proposals to eighteen in the Glassie-Cooley code and nineteen in the Holifield bill. There is, of course, a good deal of duplication in
the specific suggestions. Altogether, forty-one distinct safeguards are
found in the fourteen proposed codes under review. The reader's attention
is invited to the comparative tabular analysis of the fourteen proposed
mandatory codes in the Appendix. In support of mandatory minimum
standards it is argued that as long as investigating committees are free to
make their own rules of procedure, and change or disregard them at will,
the danger of abuse will not be removed. The investigative process is so vital an adjunct of legislative effectiveness that Congress ought not to al42 96

Cong. Rec. "1537 (July 3i, i95o).

43In a series of twelve editorials entitled "Turning on the Light" between January
March 9, 1948-
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low its perversion to publicity-seeking or vindictive ends. The prestige
and good functioning of the Congress are the real stake, and no half-way
measure should stand in the way of congressional action to establish rules
of proper procedure for all its investigative units.
When he was President of the Senate (1797-18oi) Thomas Jefferson
made a suggestion which indicates that legislation on this subject may be
long overdue. "Perhaps Congress," he wrote,
in their care for the safety of the citizen, as well as that for their own protection, may
declare by law what is necessary and proper to enable them to carry into execution the

powers vested in them, and thereby hang up a rule for the inspection of all, which may
direct the conduct of the citizen, and at the same time test the judgments they shall
44
themselves pronounce in their own case.
The bills introduced in the House for the reform of committee procedures were referred to its Committee on Rules which has not yet acted
upon any of them. In the Senate the Lucas bill was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration which held four days of hearings on
it during July and August of i94 9 . Eleven witnesses were heard including
Senators Lucas and McMahon (D., Conn.), Dr. Edward U. Condon, and
spokesmen for the AF of L, CIO, ADA, New York City Bar Association,
and Jewish War Veterans. Although there was some criticism of specific
sections of the Lucas resolution, the preponderant weight of the testimony favored the resolution in principle. Chief criticism of the Lucas
proposal came from Mr. George Meader, former chief counsel of the
Truman-Mead Committee. Mr. Meader, who has since been elected to
the House of Representatives, believed that adoption of the proposal
might easily obstruct the work of congressional committees and impair
the efficiency of investigative activities. 45 The adoption of rules of procedure, he thought, should be left to the discretion of each committee.
The way to strengthen the investigative function, he suggested, would
be to equip Congress with better staff aids.
After the hearings on the Lucas resolution, Senator Myers (D., Pa.),
who presided at the hearings, informed the Senate that the hearings had
demonstrated the need for a simple code of ethics to protect those appearing before investigating committees from unfair and defamatory treatment.46 Although the treatment of Dr. Condon by the Committee on UnManual of Parliamentary Practice § 299.
45Reform in Procedure before Congressional Committees, Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Rules and Administration on Sen. Con. Res. 2, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. 97 (1949).
Consult also Meader, Limitations of Congressional Investigation, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 775 (,949).
4695 Cong. Rec. A4813 (July 26, 1949).
44 Jefferson's
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American Activities, as described by him at the Senate hearings, indicated
the need for passing the Lucas resolution, no action was taken upon it
subsequent to the Committee hearings.
OTHER SUGGESTIONS

In addition to the four major reforms described above-broader delegation of the investigative function, a ban on special committees, voluntary committee adoption of codes of fair play, and mandatory minimum
standards-several other possible reforms have been suggested. Aside
from his three minimum standards, Judge Wyzanski suggests five other
steps for further study: that a private person should not be compelled to
testify in camera unless the majority of the committee explicitly rules to
that effect; that a witness should not be compelled to testify unless at
least one member of the committee is present in addition to the interrogator; that in any serious claim of privilege the witness ought to have
the right by motion to urge his points before the whole committee; that a
person who has been adversely criticized by a witness before a committee
should have the right to file with the committee a limited number of
written questions which should be answered in writing by the hostile witness, unless the committee by majority vote otherwise directs; and that
subpoenas to private persons should require the concurrence of a majority
of the committee.47
Professor Carr suggests improved personnel of investigating committees and their staffs. 48 Lloyd N. Cutler, Washington attorney, proposes
that Congress enact a statute creating a civil penalty for false testimony
before a congressional committee. The penalty would be the right of any
injured person to collect damages in a federal court action against the
false witness. 49 Senator Taft (R., Ohio) suggests that federal officers and
employees should not be subject to reprisals by reason of their appearance
and bona fide, truthful testimony before congressional committeessu
Others have suggested that the supervision of committee behavior be
made a matter of party responsibility to be exercised by the party policy
committees in each chamber, and that members be disciplined who violate the rules of fair play.
In the last analysis, some believe that the problem of fair play will not
47 Wyzanski, op. cit. supra note 8.

48Carr, How To Improve Congressional Inquiries, N.Y. Times Magazine 5 (August
1948).
49 In a letter to the N.Y, Times, § 4, p. 6, col. 7 (September 5, 1948).
so Sen. Con. Res. 84, 8Ist Cong. 2d Sess. (I95o).
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be solved by court decisions, statutory regulations, or procedural codes,
but by individual self-restraint, the development of a sense of personal
responsibility in exercising the investigative power, and the moral censure
of an outraged public opinion. "The problem," says Walter Lippmann,
is not one which is likely to be solved by an ingenious idea.... The problem does not
lie on the plane of formal law-making, but on the plane of the mores of the nation. We
do not have, as yet, a body of intellectual and moral habits, customs, and attitudes to
fit the realities of modem popular government.sx

Senator Pepper summed up the situation neatly twenty years ago when
he said:
Congressional investigations in general and senatorial inquisitions in particular are
not going to be controlled by the Supreme Court. Nor are they going to be regulated by
statutes or procedural devices. Let it once for all be understood that the power of
inquiry exists, that its possession is a great public trust, and that the American people
are going to pour out the vials of their wrath upon those who prove themselves un-

worthy of the trust. We have evolved worthy standards of conduct for professional
baseball players. We are hopeful of a similar evolution in the case of prize fighters. It
would be lamentable if only Senators were to be classed as invincibly barbarous.s2

CONCLUSION
At bottom, the problem is thus seen as one of protecting the rights of
individuals without impairing the performance of the investigative function. The methods employed by a few investigating committees in recent
times have caused public criticism of Congress and impaired its prestige.
Congress may continue to decline in popular esteem unless steps are taken
to curb the misuse of its investigative powers. Perhaps the best remedy
would be the development of a sense of self-restraint on the part of committee members themselves. But that cannot be guaranteed. Another
course of action would be to follow the advice of Justice Frankfurter
who maintained that "the methods and forms of each investigation should
be left for determination of Congress and its committees, as each situation
arises.1 53 But it seems evident that rules imposed by individual committees upon themselves, while a step in the right direction, are not the final
answer. No half-way measure should stand in the way of congressional
action to establish rules of proper procedure of its investigating committees. The elements of a workable code are to be found in the best practices of successful investigating committees. To avoid confusion and promote uniformity, a code of fair conduct for all investigating groups might
S Lippmann, The Senate Inquisition, 84 Forum 132

(1930).

s2Pepper, Family Quarrels 178-79, 184 (1931).
s

Frankfurter, Hands Off Investigations, 38 New Republic

329 (X924).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

well be adopted by the House and Senate as part of their standing rules.
Such a code would give Congress and the country a yardstick by which
to test the performance of every committee of investigation. In the federal
Administrative Procedure Act Congress has provided a code of procedure
for administrative agencies."1 This action should now be matched by
the enactment of a code for the guidance of its own investigators.

APPENDIX
SAFEGUARDS OF RIGHTS OF PARTIES UNDER INVESTIGATION BY CONGRES-

SIONAL COMMfITTEES AS PROPOSED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS,
ATTORNEYS, AND OTHERS

i. Any person who believes that testimony or other evidence given in a public
hearing before any committee tends to defame him or otherwise adversely
affect his reputation may file with the committee a sworn statement, concerning such testimony, which shall be made a part of the record of such
hearing.
2. Aggrieved persons may testify in own behalf, secure and examine not more
than four favorable witnesses, and cross-examine hostile witnesses, one
hour each, personally or by counsel.
3. Petition to invoke safeguard no. 2 must be filed within thirty days and

acted on within thirty days thereafter. Petitioner must swear his purpose
is not to delay or obstruct committee.
4. Right to be accompanied by counsel at public or private hearing as observer, but not as participant, or adviser while on stand, unless committee

consents.
5. Evidence shall be relevant to subject of hearing.
6. Witness may have stenographic transcript of his testimony.
7. Committee shall not publish or file any report, interim or final, unless and
until a meeting of the committee has been called upon proper notice and
such report has been approved by a majority of those voting.
8. No committee or employee thereof shall publish or file any statement or
report alleging misconduct by, or otherwise adversely commenting on, any
person unless and until such person has been advised of the alleged misconduct or adverse comment and has been given a reasonable opportunity

to present to the committee a sworn statement with respect thereto.
9. No committeeman or employee shall speak, lecture, or write about the committee for compensation.

io. No. 9 supra is to apply to standing, select and joint committees and subcommittees thereof.
ii. Subpoenas shall not issue unless approved by majority of committee in

writing.
s1 6o Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (Sup., 1950).
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12. Hearings shall be public or secret as majority of committee rules to be in

public interest.
13. Secret testimony requires presence of two committeemen, plus interrogator.
14. Accurate stenographic record must be kept of all testimony at public
hearings.
15. All witnesses, at hearings, public or secret, shall be entitled to full and fair
presentation of matter under investigation, to aid and advice of counsel,
and such other assistance as may be necessary to protect their rights.
16. All witnesses at hearings of the committee, whether public or secret, shall
be advised of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and their
right not to divulge confidential communications protected by law.
17. Any person who claims a privilege not to appear or who, having appeared,
claims a privilege not to answer a question, shall be entitled to present
through counsel a written motion and oral argument presenting the claimed
privilege to the committee.
18. Any witness at a hearing, public or secret, may question another witness
who comments upon his testimony, via a written question handed to the
chairman, who in his discretion may refuse to use part or all of it.
19. No witness shall be in contempt of the committee for refusing to obey a
subpoena, unless and until the committee has, upon notice to all its members, met and considered the alleged contempt, and by a majority of those
present voted such witness in contempt.
2o. No adverse statement or report shall be publicly released until the committee, upon due notice, has met and approved such release by quorum of
whole committee.
21. No photographs, moving pictures, television or radio broadcasts shall be
made during hearings.
22. No major investigation shall be initiated without unanimous approval of
subcommittee or majority approval of full committee.
23. All testimony taken in executive hearings shall be secret and not released
or used in public hearings without approval of majority of committee.
24. A clear statement should be made of the subject of any investigation.
25. Any witness giving testimony in open hearing which reflects adversely on
character or reputation of another person shall disclose his sources of
information, unless his answer would threaten the national security.
26. No report or statement, interim or final, shall be filed, published or released that reflects adversely on any person's character or reputation unless
based on evidence presented at an open hearing.
27. There shall be created by law a civil penalty for false testimony before a
congressional committee, the penalty to be the right of any injured person
to collect damages in a federal court action against the false witness.
Such damage actions to be placed at top of court calendars and expedited.
28. Every witness who testifies in a hearing shall have a right at the conclusion
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29.

30.
31.

32.
33.
34.

35.

36.
37.
38.

39.
4o.

41.

of his testimony either to make a sworn statement or at his option to file a
sworn statement which shall be made part of the record of such hearing,
but such oral or written statement shall be relevant to the subject of the
hearing.
Except at his own request, no reporter, editor, or publisher shall be called to
testify before a committee to be questioned concerning any publication by
him, unless upon vote of a majority of the committee or subcommittee
before whom he is called to testify. In such case the committee or subcommittee must have at least five members.
Counsel for the committee must be a lawyer.
A person who is under the committee's scrutiny should be fully apprised
of the matters as to which the committee proposes to inquire.
The committee should identify the witnesses upon whose testimony it has
relied in commencing the hearing.
Investigations should be conducted by groups within the regular standing
committees of the House or Senate and not by special committees.
No legislator who is an interested party or who is in a position to shake
down potential witnesses should be permitted to serve as head of an investigating subcommittee.
Investigations should be confined to important matters of public concern, as distinguished from party interests, and should be conducted in a
non-partisan manner.
Investigations should be conducted in the open.
No witness should be cited for contempt of Congress for refusal to answer
questions as to his religious or political beliefs.
Every investigating committee should be supplied with expert counsel and
staff investigators especially trained in the art of fact-fMiding by democratic
methods.
No transcript of testimony taken under oath at either a public hearing or
an executive session shall be altered or edited.
No summary of a report or prediction of the contents of a report or a
statement of his conclusions concerning an investigation may be made by a
member prior to the issuance of a duly approved report. Any member
violating this provision shall, on the vote of the majority of a quorum of the
committee, be denied the right to take part in the formulation of or vote
upon the committee report with respect to such investigation.
All of the testimony on which a report is based shall be released concurrently with the report.

PROPOSED REFORMS
COmPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED CODES

(The numbers after each proposal are keyed to the preceding
list of forty-one safeguards.)
I. Lucas Bill, Sen. Con. Res. 2, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1948)
X. § 2
7. §8
8.§9
2.§3
3-§4

9. §Io

§5

10. §iI

4.

5. § 6

ii.

(Counsel may only observe) § 5

6. (at cost of transcript) §7

12.

§8

II. Holifield Bill, H.R. 74, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. (1949)

i. §L

ii. §B

2. §L

12. §C

3. §M

13. §D

4. (Right of counsel to examine and
cross-examine) § L
5. §N
6. (at cost of transcript) § E
7. §0
8. §P

14. § E
15. § F
16. §H
17. § I
18. §J
rg. §K
20. §P

9. §Q

II. Buchanan Bill, H.R. 824, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. (1949)
15. § 2(a)
i. § 2(c)
2. (or have such material stricken
from the record) § 2(c)

28. § 2(b)
29. § 3

IV. Javits Bill, H. J. Res. 2o, 8ist Cong. ist Sess. (i949)
6. § 4W4
I. § 4(6)
2. (no mention of favorable wit- 1o. § 4
21. (while any witness is testifying)
nesses) §4(6)
§ 4(5)
4. (Adviceofcounselallowedwitness
whiletestifyingunlessmajorityof 24. § 4()
28. § 4(3)
committee disapproves) § 4(2)
5. § 4()

V. Douglas Bill, H.R. 4564, 8oth Cong. 1st Sess. (1947)
I. § 2(c)

1.

§ 2(a)

2. (or have such material *stricken 28. § 2(b)
29. § 3
from the record) § 2(c)
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VI. Klein Bill, H.R. 3443, 8ist Cong. 2d Sess. (1950)
i.§ (6)(i)
5- §1
2. (call a "reasonable number" of
6. § 4
witnesses in his behalf) § (6) (ii) Io. § 7
(iii) (iv)
14. (keep stenographic record of
4. (Advice of counsel allowed witexecutive sessions also) § 4
ness while testifying unless ma- 2i. (while witness is testifying) § 5
jority of committee disapproves) 24. § I
§2

25.

§4

VII. Statement by Forty-five Law School Professors
2. (Number of witnesses not speci-

26. (Conclui sions should not rest on

fled) §§ b, e
4. ("advice and assistance" of coun-

undisclo: sed material in committee files) §f

sel) §d

VIII. Proposal of Judge Wyzanski
4. Suggestion (a)

31. §c
32. §C

28. Suggestion (b)

14. Suggestion (c)

IX. Proposal by the New York City Bar Association
i. § (6)(a)

5. § (x)

(call a "reasonable number" of 6. § (4)
witnesses on his behalf) § (6) (b) io. § 7
(c) (d)
14. (keep stenographic record of
4. (Advice of counsel allowed witexecutive sessions also) § (4)
ness while testifying unless ma- 21. (while witness is testifying) § (5)
jority of committee disapproves) 24. § (i)
2.

§ (2)

28. § (4)

,X. Proposal by Henry H. Glassie and Thomas M. Cooley
i. (Statement must be filed within 6. (In addition, any person may
ten days of testimony if public, or
have a transcript of a public
hearing at cost) § III (B) and (D)
within ten days after release of
7. § VI(A)
the testimony if taken in execu12. (public, unless majority of quotive session) § IV (D)
4. (Counsel may advise client, chalrum orders executive session)
lenge questions and question in§ II (B)
terest of any member) § V (A) 13. (Must have quorum of the committee and the committee counand (B)
5. (Majority vote of quorum present
sel-or staff member designated
determines relevancy) § IX
by the counsel-'present) §III (A)

PROPOSED REFORMS
28. (Statement must be given to
14. § III (B)
16. ("Nothing in these rules shall imcounsel for the committee four
pair the right of a witness to redays before the hearing or two
days after the witness is notified,
fuse to answer on the ground of
self-incrimination") § IV(E)
whicheverislater) § IV (A)
18. ("Theinterrogatoriesshallbeused 31. ("All subpoenas shall designate
or not in accordance with the disthe matter of inquiry with reasonable particularity as well as the
cretion of the majority of a quorumpresent";ifnotusedtheymay
specific documents or other evibe appended to the transcript if
dence required to be produced")
theperson submitting them so de§VII (3)
34. (no such member may take any
sires) § IV(B)
part. If a member is challenged by
21. §VIII
23. ("The transcript of any execuanywitness or member the majorityvoteof a quorum of theremaintive session may, under conditions prescribed by, a majority
ing members shall determine)
of the committee, be made avail§ I (D)
able to any interested person 39. § III(F)
upon a confidential basis without 40. § VI(B) (C) (D)
being made public") § III (E)
41. § VI(E)
XI. Proposed by Arnold, Fortas and Porter
31. Suggestion no. 4
i. Suggestion no. 2
2. Suggestions nos. 2 and 3
32. Suggestion no. 4
XII. Proposal by Prof. Stanley Surrey
I. §3

6. (at cost of transcript) § 6

2.§4

ii. § 10

3. (twenty days instead of thirty.
Committee shall secure witnesses if majority deems it necessary.
Committee need not act if majority finds evidence does not
reflect adversely. Person shall be
notified of time and place ofmeeting.)

13. (no person required to appear unless two committeemen are present)

§5
4. (right of counsel to advise) § 2

§ I

23.

(any investigation or study must
have majority approval of committee or subcommittee) § 1o
§9

25.

§7

22.

26. § 8

XIII. Proposal by the American Civil Liberties Union
1. § 9
6. (at cost of transcript) § 4(e)
2. §9
7. § 12(a)
3. § 1o
8. § 12(b)
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9- § 13

i6. § 6(a)

II. § 4(b)

17. § 6(b)

12.

§ 4(c)

13- § 4(d)
14. § 4(e)
15. § 5(a)

18. § 7
19. §8

28. § 5(b)

XIV. Proposal by The Washington Post (a series of twelve editorials entitled "Turning on the Light")

i. Suggestion'no. 6
28. Suggestion no.
33. Suggestion no.
4. Suggestion no. 7
6. (at cost of transcript) Suggestion 34. Suggestion no.
35. Suggestion no.
no. 7
i8. (Questions "within appropriate 36. Suggestion no.
limits") Suggestion no. 5
37. Suggestion no.
19. (require a majority vote of 38. Suggestion no.
Senate or House to punish for
contempt) Suggestion no. 9

6
x
2
3
4
9
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